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A Critical Problem Needing a Bolder Solution?: A
Response to Atinuke 0. Adediran's Nonprofit
Board Composition
LLOYD HITOSHI MA YER*

The governing boards of nonprofit organizations, and particularly of
nonprofits that serve low income and other vulnerable populations, fail to
adequately include the populations that they serve. 1 At least this is the common
understanding among people familiar with these boards. 2 Professor Atinuke
Adediran not only confirms the existence of this problem but clarifies it in four
important ways. 3 Professor Adediran also proposes concrete steps to address it; 4
although, the clarity she has brought to the problem raises the question of
whether she could have been bolder in her proposed solutions.
The clarity comes from new data, careful consideration of previous
research, identification of an existing gap in legal scholarship, and the
importation from the for-profit context of a helpful theoretical framework. First,
Professor Adediran confirms the extent of the population -served board
representation problem among a small but critical subset of these nonprofitspublic interest legal organizations (PILOs). 5 PILOs are important because they
partially fill the enormous gap in civil legal services available to low-income
communities. 6 The breadth of the data, encompassing over 500 PILOs from
throughout the country, provides a comprehensive snapshot of board
compositions by gender, race, and "type" (type is based on professional
background, e.g., accountant, educator, lawyer, or whether the board member is
client-eligible or a community member). 7 The data confirms the relative paucity
of board members who are potential clients or community members and the

*Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 See, e.g., Alyssa Conrardy, A Common Nonprofit Racial Justice Missing Ingredient:
Strong Community Ties, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/acommon -nonprofit-racial-equity-missing-ingredient-strong-community-ties/
[https://perma.cc/TYE4-9EGQ].
2/d.
3 See generally Atinuke 0. Adediran, Nonprofit Board Composition, 83 OHIO ST. L.J.
357 (2022); see also infra notes 5, 12, 17, 21 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 27 and accompanying text. For an example of suggestions by others
for improving board diversity, see Diversity on Nonprofit Boards, NAT'L COUNCIL OF
NONPROFITS,
https ://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/di versity-nonprofitboards [https://perma.cc/TYB6-5YDW].
5 Adediran, supra note 3, at 384-89.
6 See LEGAL SERVICES CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017) (finding 86 percent of the civil legal problems
faced by low-income individuals "received inadequate or no legal help").
7 Adediran, supra note 3, at 387-89.
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limited representation of racial minorities, particularly among non-Legal
Services Corporation (LSC)-funded PILOs that are not subject to a board
composition mandate. 8
The empirical data is not only thorough and compelling, but Professor
Adediran also supplements it with qualitative interview data that nicely
complements the quantitative information. 9 While not intended to be
representative, the dozens of interviews with PILO chief executive officers and
board members provide helpful context to the quantitative information. 1 For
example, the interviews help illustrate why, absent outside pressure, PILO
leaders tend to seek board members whose social capital gives access to
financial capital and whose human capital provides legal and financial expertise
( as opposed to board members whose social capital or human capital gives better
access to information about the population served). 11
Second, Professor Adediran gathers research that supports the conclusion
that a failure to include more-or sometimes any-members of the served
population hinders boards from fulfilling their roles. 12 As she details, this
literature spans a variety of nonprofit contexts and consistently finds a lack of
served population representation on boards, resulting in a negative effect on the
interests, skills, and knowledge found in the nonprofit boardroom. 13 This is
particularly true given the likely influence of wealthy private donors who
provide significant financial support, whether they serve on boards or not.
Similarly, in the PILO context, law firms and their lawyers influence boards by
providing support in a variety of ways, as detailed in Professor Adediran' s
previous work. 14
This research, especially when considered in the aggregate, arguably paints
a starker picture than Professor Adediran draws from it. To her credit, Professor
Adediran is careful not to read more into each article or study than they support,
including her own research. But collectively this research presents a relatively
compelling case for how boards of nonprofits that serve low-income and other
vulnerable populations unduly weigh financial considerations compared to
furtherance of missions. 15 For example, the research highlights how the lack of

°

8 See

42 U.S.C. § 2996f(c) (requiring at least one-third of the governing bodies of
recipients of LSC funding to consist of persons who are eligible clients).
9 Adediran, supra note 3, at 387.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 392-96.
12 See sources cited in id. at 368-69 nn.51, 56, 58, 377 n.130, 399 n.269.
13 See, e.g., id. at 368-70, 377,399.
14 See generally Atinuke 0. Adediran, Solving the Pro Bono Mismatch, 91 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1035 (2020) [hereinafter Adediran, Solving]; Atinuke 0. Adediran, The Relational
Costs of Free Legal Services, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357 (2020) [hereinafter Adediran,
Relational Costs].
15 See generally Adediran Solving, supra note 14; Adediran, Relational Costs, supra
note 14.

76

A RESPONSE TO NONPROFIT BOARD COMPOSITION

[Vol. 83

participation by members of the served population leads to bias in favor of
finances to the detriment of mission. 16
Third, Professor Adediran correctly observes that legal requirements for
board members tend to focus on the board's monitoring role and mask this
bias .17 This is because the monitoring role is most strongly related to the classic
fiduciary duties of board members to their nonprofits. 18 It is, therefore, common
for legal considerations of nonprofit governance to focus on the monitoring role
and discuss board composition only as it relates to that specific role. 19 But doing
so risks causing a board to give insufficient attention to its other important roles,
including setting long-term policies, providing advice and counsel to
management, and providing resources, including non-financial ones. 20
Fourth, Professor Adediran uses the concept of board capital to provide a
theoretical framework for explaining why the lack of representation prevents
boards from having all the resources they need to best fulfill their duties. 21 She
correctly notes that this framework, by encompassing not only human capital
but also financial and social capital, helps counter the legal tendency to focus
myopically on boards' monitoring roles. 22 For example, and as already noted,
the board capital concept exposes how some PILOs tend to narrowly view
desirable social and human capital and ignore how that capital could also
contribute to better understanding the populations served and their needs. 23
Having clarified the extent of the problem, Professor Adediran' s proposed
solutions are a bit of a letdown because she relies on voluntary actions by PILOs
and their private supporters. 24 Professor Adediran is also hesitant to explore
replicating existing legal mandates, such as those for LSC-funded PILOs or
other tax -exempt nonprofits, even though such research would inform and might
support imposing similar mandates in this context. 25
More specifically, Professor Adediran foreswears any reliance on legal
mandates out of concerns relating to both the differences between for-profit and
16 See, e.g., Julie I. Siciliano, The Relationship of Board Member Diversity to
Organizational Performance, 15 J. Bus. ETHICS 1313, 1318 (1996) (displaying the largest

percentage of board members are company owners, implying access to capital.).
17 Adediran, supra note 3, at 376.
18 See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
§§ 2.02 (duty of loyalty), 2.03 (duty of care) (AM. LAW INST. 2021).
19 See, e.g., Peter Molk & D. Daniel Sokol, The Challenges of Nonprofit Governance,
62 B.C. L. REV. 1497, 1502---03 (2021) (setting the issue of board diversity to the side to
focus on the monitoring role).
20 See generally MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 8.01, cmt. (CMT. ON
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, 3d ed. 2008); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHARITABLE
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.05, cmts. a, e (AM. LAW INST. 2021); WILLIAM G. BOWEN,
INSIDE THE BOARDROOM: GOVERNANCE BY DIRECTORS AND TRUSTEES 18-20 (1994).
21 Adediran, supra note 3, at 378-80.
22 Id. at 378.
23 Id. at 393, 395.
24 Id. at 409-10.
25 See id. at 409.
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nonprofit entities that may counsel against expanding for-profit board diversity
mandates to nonprofits and the risk of undermining the tasks that current PILO
boards tend to do well. 26 Instead, Professor Adediran relies on encouraging
PILOs to change their practices in several ways, such as recruiting more nonlawyers and eligible clients and adopting term limits, and imploring private
supporters of PILOs to advocate for such changes. 27 These relatively mild,
voluntary solutions are vulnerable to several criticisms.
First, these solutions rest on the uncertain assumption that most PILOs and
their existing private supporters-principally lawyers and law firms-lack
sufficient knowledge regarding either the lack of board diversity or its negative
effects on PILO boards. The interviews and research cited by Professor
Adediran raise the troubling possibility that PILOs and their supporters have
this knowledge. 28 If that is the case, then it is the will to act on this knowledge
that is lacking-not the knowledge itself.
Professor Adediran's decision to not recommend legal mandates also rests
on the possibility that more research is required to confirm the extent and effect
of the problem before pursuing a bolder solution. This is understandable given
that legal mandates are blunt instruments and can be politically difficult to
impose and sometimes to enforce. 29 For example, Professor Adediran suggests
future research could identify factors other than the LSC Act mandate that lead
to eligible client board membership. 30 But given that such membership is only
one percent in non-LSC funded PILOs, there appears to be no such factors
beyond the mandate itself. 31 That said, it likely would be helpful to learn more
about the downsides or challenges of greater eligible client board involvement,
including in respect to their integration onto boards. 32
With respect to funders, Professor Adediran relies on the possibility of
convincing private foundations to become more significant supporters for
PILOs and existing corporate funders to add board diversity conditions to their
funding. 33 While these options have some promise, it is unclear how many
private foundations would shift their funding priorities to encompass more
26 Id. at 409-10.
27 Adediran,

supra note 3, at 409-10.

28 See id. at 396--403.
29 See Robin S. Golden, Toward a Model of Community Representation for Legal

Assistance Lawyering: Examining the Role of Legal Assistance Agencies in Drug-Related
Evictions from Public Housing, 17 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 527, 539--40 (1998) (explaining
the board composition mandate that was eventually incorporated into the original LSC
legislation was the most controversial requirement relating to tbe federal Office of Economic
Opportunity's legal services program); Elizabeth McCulloch, Let Me Show You How: Pro
Se Divorce Courses and Client Power, 48 FLA. L. REV. 481, 486 (1996) (questioning tbe
compliance with the LSC-funded PILO board composition mandate and its effectiveness in
ensuring client voices are heard at the board level).
30 Adediran, supra note 3, at 412.
31 Id. at 400.
32 See id. at 401.
33 Id. at413-17.
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PILOs or how many funders of any type would voluntarily choose to impose
such conditions. This solution would therefore likely not reach some PILOs and
leave the communities they serve insufficiently represented on their boards.
There are precedents for a bolder solution-and not only in the for-profit
business context. 34 First, as Professor Adediran notes and already mentioned
here, the LSC Act requires that PILOs receiving LSC funding have at least onethird of their governing bodies consist of eligible clients. 35 The requirement has
created a sharp difference in representation on PILO boards depending on
whether a PILO accepts LSC funding or not. 36 It is unclear to what extent the
increased participation of eligible clients and racial diversity on LSC-funded
PILO boards makes a difference, especially given interviews indicating that
fully involving them can be difficult. 37 A promising avenue of further research
is to see if there are programmatic differences correlated with the board
composition differences that do not stem solely from the other LSC Act
requirements. And, as Professor Adediran suggests, increasing non-lawyer
board members likely requires not following the current LSC Act requirement
that boards of LSC-funded PILOs consist of sixty percent lawyers (and relaxing
that requirement for LSC-funded PILOs). 38
Second, there is another available legal vehicle for imposing board
composition requirements on all PILOs, not just those that receive LSC funding,
as Professor Adediran acknowledges. 39 PILOs generally enjoy tax exemption
under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3), subject to providing services to
low-income individuals for free or in exchange for fees based on ability to pay, 40
or alternatively, in a manner designed to ensure their cases further the public
interest and would not be economically feasible for private firms. 41 The status
is effectively an indirect funding source, as it eases obtaining funding from
private foundations and other donors, including through tax-deductible

34 See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform and the
Sustainability Imperative, 131 YALE L.J. 1217 (2022) ; Jaclyn Jaeger, Emerging State Board
Diversity Laws Encourage Proactive Approach, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www .complianceweek.com/boards-and-shareholders/emerging-state-boarddi versity-la ws-encourage-proacti ve-approach/29681.article
[https ://perma.cc/JMQ4MVFQ].
35 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(c).
36 Adediran, supra note 3, at 400-01.
37 Id. at 401-02 (summarizing interviews that indicate the difficulties of integrating
client-eligible board members); id. at 455-57 (identifying racial composition differences
between LSC-funded and non-LSC-funded PILOs).
3842 U.S.C. § 2996f(c).
39 See Adediran, supra note 3, at 409 n.300.
4oSee Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149, amplified by Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B.
177.
41 Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154, amplified by
Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
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charitable contributions from individuals and corporations. 42 Both Congress and
the Treasury Department have in other contexts required or suggested certain
board compositions as a condition of qualifying for exemption under section
501(c)(3). 43 For example, Congress has set specific board composition
requirements for section 501(c)(3) credit counseling organizations. 44 And the
Treasury Department considers a board consisting primarily of community
leaders, as opposed to doctors or administrators, a significant factor when
considering whether a nonprofit hospital is described in section 501(c)(3). 45 It,
therefore, is plausible for federal tax law to be the mechanism for imposing a
mandatory board composition requirement on all PILOs by making it a
condition for a PILO to be described in section 501(c)(3).
None of these criticisms should detract from the important contributions that
Professor Adediran has made through her article. She has taken what is an often
recognized, but less often carefully analyzed, problem and given it quantitative,
qualitative, and theoretical clarity. 46 She has also carefully considered and
described both how to initially address this problem and what further research
is advisable to address it more comprehensively in the future. 47 And it may read
too much into the existing research, including Professor Adediran's, to conclude
that the lack of board diversity is such a serious problem, and the possible
negative effects of board composition mandates are so minor, that a bolder
solution is needed than what Professor Adediran proposes.
Professor Adediran has significantly advanced the debate over nonprofit
board composition. 48 Her effort to do so is especially critical at this time of
heightened concerns about racial discrimination and economic inequality. 49 It is
a hope that her work will further encourage nonprofits, funders, and
policymakers to take renewed interest in this issue.
42 See

I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(l), (c)(2) (charitable contribution deduction); /RC
Section 4945(h) - Expenditure Responsibility, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/irc-section -4945h-expenditure-responsibility[https ://perma.cc/7 CW8-KPJ3]
(explaining the additional administrative burdens when private foundations make grants to
organizations that are not exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
43 See e.g., infra notes 44--45.
44 I.R.C. § 501(q)(l)(D) (also applicable to credit counseling organizations that are taxexempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)).
45 Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; see also St.
David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding
not all the factors listed in Rev. Rul. 69-545, including the community board factor, must be
present for a hospital to be described in section 501(c)(3)); Gary J. Young, Federal TaxExemption Requirements for Joint Ventures Between Nonprofit Hospital Providers and ForProfit Entities: Form Over Substance?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 327, 358, 358 nn.198-99
(2004) (arguing the IRS has effectively taken the same position as the St. David's Health
Care System court).
46 See generally Adediran, supra note 3.
47Jd. at409-10,412-13.
48 Id. at 359---62 (highlighting the scholarship gap filled by Professor Adediran 's
article).
4 9 See Conrardy, supra note 1.

